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ABSTRACTS
Mary lane Plumer*
CORPORATIONS - CONSIDERATIONS INDICATING PROPRIETARY RATHER
THAN DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONSHIP-The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue petitioned this court to review a decision of the Tax Court of the
United States in which that court held that the interest paid on twenty year
income debenture bonds issued by defendant taxpayer was not deductible in
computing income and excess profits tax as interest on investment under the
Revenue Act.1 The defendant is a closely held family corporation organized
under the laws of Indiana. The bonds in question were authorized as part of a
reorganization scheme to be issued in return for preferred stock then outstanding, or to be sold to raise additional capital; but buyers were limited to stockholders in the company. The 8 per cent interest on the debentures was payable
only out of net income, and defaulted payments did not accumulate. Holders
at liquidation or insolvency took after all creditors and were superior only to
common stockholders. The president and secretary of the corporation were
trustees for the bondholders and both had purchased debentures but had not paid
for them in cash. Under these circumstances the court reversed the Tax Court's
decision. It held that the definite maturity date was not controlling since it is
not unusual, and· in fact the Indiana statute 2 provides, that preferred' stock may
have a maturity date. A case of this kind must be decided upon the provisions
of the instrument evidencing the obligation in the light of the circumstances in
each case. The distinguishing feature of proprietary relationship is risk, that of
debtor-creditor is security. Here the debenture holders took the risk. C ommiswmer of Internal Revenue v. John Kelley Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1944) 146 F.
(2d) 406. 8

* Managing Editor, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW.
1

Revenue Act 1936 §§ 23 (b), II5 (a), 26 U.S.C.A., Int. Rev. Code (1940),

§ 23 (b), II5 (a).
2
3

Burns' Ann. St. Ind. (1933), § 25-205.
See 43' MICH. L. REv. 628 (1944); 123 A.L.R. 856 (1939).
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CoRPORATIONs-DuTY OwED To OTHER STOCKHOLDERS BY ONE DisMISSING APPEAL, TAKEN UNDER CHANDLER AcT, FROM CoNFIRMATION OF
REORGANIZATION PLAN-Respondents, preferred stockholders in the Higbee
Company, appealed from the confirmation of a plan for the reorganization of
that company under the Bankruptcy Act,1 basing their appeal largely on objections to allowances for junior indebtedness which prejudiced preferred stockholders, and asking that ·the confirmation be set aside. Subsequently they sold
their stock and their appeal to the claimants under the junior debt, for seven
times the market value of the stock. After attempting unsuccessfully to intervene
in the appeal one Young, a preferred stockholder of the same class as respondents, filed a petition in the district court to compel respondents to account to the
debtor corporation, or to themselves for the amount received over and above
the fair value of the stock. The district court affirmed a special master's .finding
that respondents had appealed on their own behalf .and not as representatives
of a class, and dismissed the petition. The Circuit Court a.ffirmed,2 and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, reversed. Where two preferred
stockholders appealed as individuals but relied on the fact that every other
preferred stockholder, as well as themselves, would be injured by confirmation,
they owed a duty to other preferred stockholders to deal fairly with their rights,
and could be required to account for proceeds of the sale when the appeal was
dismissed by stipulation. The court also considered the fact that the respondents
had appealed under the Chandler Act, 3 and since the purpose of that act is to
protect creditors from each other, and to secure a ratable distribution of the
bankrupt estate, it cannot be said that Congress intended that the right of appeal
should be sold to the prejudice of other creditors. Young v. Higbee, (U.S.
1945) 65 S. Ct. 594·
INSURANCE-EFFECT OF FACILITY OF .PAYMENT CLAUSE IN LIFE POLICY ON DISPOSITION OF PROCEEDS WHEN INSURER STANDS INDIFFERENTAn endowment policy issued to one Wade provided that in the event of his
death before th_e date 'of maturity of the policy, the proceeds would be paid to
"the executor or administrator of the insured" unless paid in accordance with
the provision that the company "may make any payment" to the insured, husband or wife or any relative by blood or marriage of the insured, "or to any
other person appearing to said company to be equitably entitled to the same by
reason of having incurred expense on behalf of the insured, or for his burial."
Before his death, Wade made a written application to the company requesting
that they designate plaintiff as beneficiary, subject to the company's option to
pay to any of the aboved named persons, including the executor or administrator. When Wade died the plaintiff c:ontracted for the debts connec·ted with his
last illness, made arrangements for his burial, and in the meantime demanded
payment of the proceeds of the policy. Before consummation of plaintiff's plans,
Wade's estranged wife procured the services of the Granberry Mortuary Com1 II

U.S.C. (1943), § 207, 52 Stat. L. 883-905 (1938);

§§ 501-676.
2
3

(C.C.A. 2d, 1944) 142 F. (2d) 1004.
(U.S. 1945) 65 S.Ct. 71.
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U.S.C. (1943),
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pany to bury her husband, and on the basis of the debt thus contracted, T. C.
Granberry of that company secured the appointment as administrator of Wade's
estate and as such claimed the proceeds of the policy. Plaintiff brought an action
in the lower court to recover the proceeds from the insurance company and at
the company's instance Granberry was interpleaded. The lower court decreed
that the proceeds of the policy, after allowance of attorney fees and court costs
for the company and plaintiff, be paid to Granberry, personally. Held, reversed
with instructions to the trial court to adjudge in favor of plaintiff for the
proceeds of the policy and for costs. "The facility of payment clause . • . is for
the protection of the insurer and does not grant or take away any cause of
action from any person." 1 If, as here, the insurance company voluntarily does
not discharge its obligation pursuant to the facility of payment clause, only the
beneficiary can enforce payment. Plaintiff is the undisputed beneficiary under
the terms of the policy; the fact that someone else paid the last illness and
funeral bills does not entitle him to the proceeds unless the insurance company
has chosen to exercise its option. The company is not entitled to recover costs
and attorney fees since, having failed to exercise its right under the facility of
payment clause, it was bound to pay the beneficiary and could not maintain
interpleader between her and another. The dissent favored affirmance on the
. theory that the facts showed an intent on the part of Wade that his last illness
and funeral expenses be paid out of his insurance. Therefore, plaintiff was
intended only as trustee of the proceeds of the policy, and since the trustee
could not carry out the trust, the court should have applied the cy pres doctrine
and permitted the execution of the trust by Granberry. Jenkins v. Metropoli,..
tan Life Ins. Co., (Colo. 1944) 155 P. (2d) 772!'
LABOR LAw-J urusmcTION oF DISTRICT CouRT To ENJOIN ELECTION
ORDERED BY N.L.R.B. WHERE N.L.R.B. HAs ExcEEDED !Ts AUTHORITYIn a representation proceeding before the N.L.R.B. under section 9(d) of the
National Labor Relations Act,1 petitioner union was found to be the successor
of a company-dominated union previously disestablished by the board, and was
denied a place on the ballot. Petitioner then asked this court to enjoin the
regional director from conducting an election under the act on the ground that
since intermediate action by the board in representation proceedings is not
subject to court review, while its action in complaint proceedings is subject to
review; when the board made a finding of successorship in a representation proceeding, the union was cut off from the right of appeal on the question of
successorship which it would otherwise have had. Held, petitioner is entitled
to an appropriate restraining order. The board was without authority under the
act to determine a successorship question in an employee-representation proceeding. "Since •.. the Board has transgressed the bounds of its statutory
1 The Court at p. 774 in principal case quoted from 29 AM. JuR. p. 956, § 1280.
2 See annotation on right to enforce facility of payment clause in 28 A. L. R.
1350 (1924); 49 A.L.R. 939 (1927); and annotation on rights inter se of persons
other than the insurer in respect of proceeds paid by insurer under facility of payment
clause in 75 A.L.R. 1435 (1931).
l

29 U.S.C. (1940), § 159 (c).

II94

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

authority ••. nothing further is required to justify equitable relief since clearly
there is no adequate remedy at law." Brotherhood and Union of Transit Em,ployees of Baltimore v. Madden, (Md. D.C. 1944) 58 F. Supp. 366.
REs J uo1cATA-D1sM1ssAL IN FEDERAL CouRT As A BAR TO NEW AcTION
IN STATE COURT ON SAME CAUSE OF ACTION-Plaintiff, as administratrix,
brought suit in a state court against defendant railway for the wrongful death of
her intestate. This suit was instituted by plaintiff on a pauper's oath. Upon application of the defendant the case was transferred to the federal district court.
Plaintiff refused to give bond or :file a pauper's oath as required by the local rules
of the federal court. For this reason, the court dismissed the plaintiff's suit. She
then reinstituted her suit in the state court within twelve months after the alleged
wrongful death. The trial court held that the dismissal of plaintiff's case in the
federal court was a bar to its prosecution in the state court and dismissed the suit.
On appeal, held, reversed and remanded. Defendant relies on Federal Rule
41 (b) which provides that on failure of plaintiff to comply with court rules, defendant may move for dismissal of an action and "unless the court in its order for
dismissal otherwise specifies, dismissal • . • other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue, operat;es as an adjudication upon the merits." 1
The cases cited oy defendant m support of his contention do not involve the .
question of a disposition on the merits. Also m none of these is reference made to
the federal statute which provides that the rules shall not enlarge, abridge or
modify the substantive rights of any litigant. 2 The right of plaintiff here under
section 8572 of the Tennssee Code 3 to commence a new action within one year,
following a judgment of dismissal without a trial on the merits, is a substantative
right and Rule 4 I (b) should be so construed that the rights of litigants under
this section will not be impaired. The federal court did not state whether the
case was dismissed with or without prejudice and it cannot be held to be a "dismissal on the merits because it is not true either in law or fact." 4 Adcox v.
Southern Ry. Go., (Tenn. 1944) 184 S. W. (2d) 37.
TAXATION-GIFT IN CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH BY AN INSANE PERSON-In 1926 Helen Hall Vail, incurably insane, was adjudicated incompetent
by the Supreme Court of New York, and a committee was appointed to take
care of her property which was then producing an income of $300,000 per
annum. She was then 70 years of age. Application was made to the court to
make allowances out of the income for Mrs. Vail's daughter, the three sons of
a deceased daughter, and her brother and sisters. The court, after reciting that
the daughter and grandchildren or their issue would be the only heirs, upon the
death of the incompetent, and that if she were competent she. would desire
"that the allowance hereinafter :fixed be made," directed that certain allowances
be paid to the daughter, the grandchildren, the brother and the sisters out of
Mrs. Vail's income. Later, upon the increase of the annual income, the court
increased the allowances, retroactively to the date of the original order. Mrs.
28 U.S.C. (1940) following§ 723c.
Act of June, 1934, 28 U.S.C. (1940) following§ 723c.
3 Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) § 8572.
4 Principal case at 40.
·

1

2
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Vail died in 1935, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue included in her
gross estate the total sum paid out in allowances from the date of the order of
the New York Supreme Court, on the ground that the allowances were gifts
made in contemplation of death and should be included under section 302 ( c)
of the Revenue Act.1 It was the contention of petitioner that ( 1} Mrs. Vail
made no transfer, and therefore could have had no motive with respect to it;
and ( 2) that the court under the state law had no power to act on the property
after the incompetent's death, and therefore, to assume that the court sanctioned
transfers of a testamentary character is to assume that it exceeded its powers.
Held, "that where, as in New York, the court is to substitute itself as nearly
as may be for the incompetent, and to act upon the same motives and considerations as would have moved her, the transfer is, in legal effect, her act and the
motive is hers." 2 Since in the case of the heirs, OQe of the strongest arguments
for the order providing for the gifts was that the entire estate would go to the
heirs eventually anyway, and since there was no showing of need on' the part
of the heirs, the gifts to them were within section 302 ( c), except for the
amount allowed to the daughters by Mrs. Vail while competent. As to the
amounts allowed collateral relatives, that order was made on a showing of need
and the gifts were not, therefore, within section 302 (c). To the extent indicated the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming the ruling of the
Commissioner was reversed. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. 'll. George T.
McGowan, (U.S. 1945) 65 S. Ct. 496.3
TRUSTS-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-DOES TH~ STATUTE WHICH EXECUTES
A DRY TRUST (SIMILAR TO STATUTE OF UsEs) APPLY TO AN ORAL TRUST OF

LANn?-John Petetson, in contemplation of death, distributed his property
among his children. He deeded certain land to William under an oral trust for
the use of Charles, the father of plaintiffs. Charles was indebted to the defendant
in the amount of $800 and William, at the request of Charles, deeded the land
to defendant. Emma, the wife of Charles and mother of plaintifJs, never consented in writing to this transfer, as she had, prior to the time of transfer, been
adjudged insane and continued in that condition until her death which occurred
after the death of Charles. No part of the indebtedness to defendant has ever
been paid except by the land transfer. Plaintiffs sued in the lower court to determine the claim of defendant to the land and that court held that plaintiffs
owned an undivided one-third thereof and defendant an undivided two-thirds
thereof. On appeal by both parties, held, affirmed. Had John Peterson conveyed
the land directly to Charles and had he died before his wife, the inchoate right of
Emma to one-third of Charles' lands would have descended to her and passed to
the plaintiffs. Since William had a mere passive trust in the land, a similar result
26 u.s.c. (1940).
Principal case at 498.
3
On question of when transfer deemed to be in contemplation of death see
7 A.L.R. 1028 (1920); 21 A.L.R. 1335 (1922); 41 A.L.R. 989 (1926); 75 A.L.R.
544 (1931); 120 A.L.R. 170 (1939).
1

2
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is reached and Emma's undivided one-third passed on her death to her daughters,
plaintiffs here. 1 Peterson v. Anderson, (Minn. 1944) 16 N.W. (2d) 185. 2
WILLS-DOES RENOUNCED LEGACY

1

PASS

TO RESIDUARY LEGATEE OR TO

HEms?-By the will of Fred Gates, Ilo Crabtree was left a legacy of $15,000
and Fred's wife, Viola, was made the residuary legatee. Ilo renounced her legacy
in -order that it might become a portion of Fred's estate and pass to the residuary
legatee under his will. Viola' was executrix of the will of her husband and, in the
court order discharging her as executrix and closing the estate, a finding was
made that Ilo had filed in that court her written relinquishment of rights under
the will. No notice of a hearing on this matter was given to the plaintiffs, heirs
of Fred;who now bring suit against Ilo in her representative capacity as executrix
of the will of Viola, now deceased, asking that Fred's estate be reopened and that
the estates of Fred and Viola be charged in favor of the plaintiffs with the amount
of the legacy claimed to have been renounced. The trial court gave judgment
for plaintiffs and defendant appeals. Held, reversed. The question is whether
the renounced legacy should go as intestate property or· by way of assignment to
the heirs;. or as a part of the residuary estate to .the residuary legatee. There is
no case directly in point in this state. The rule as stated by Page is: "If the will
contains a general residuary clause, which by its terms, may pass the property in
question, a renounced legacy or device passes under such residuary clause, unless
the will shows testator's intention to make some other disposition ... in case of
renunciation." 1 Since the legacy was conditioned on the legatee surviving the
testator and is followed by the _residuary clause to his wife, it is certain he intended his wife to have all the property if the legatee did not survive him. This
is unlike a case where a residuary legatee renounces so that the legacy must go as
intestate property; and it is a sound rule because, when a testator attempts to
dispose of all his property by will, the instrument should be construed so as to
avoid intestacy, if possible. It is analagous to a lapsed legacy which passes under
the residuary clause unless a contrary. intent appears. Myers v. Smith, (Iowa
1944) 16 N. W. (2d) 628. 2
WILLS-WHEN Is BANK DEPOSIT AGREEMENT TEsTAMENTARY?-The

five plaintiffs and two defendants are all brothers and sisters, children of Elizabeth Hamara, who died intestate. At the time of her death the mother and the
two defendants had a joint bank account, the signature card designating all three
as owners. The printed portion of the card stated that the amount deposited belonged to them "as joint tenants and not as tenants in commop" with right of
Minn. Stat., 1941, § 525.16, Minn. Stat. (Mason Supp., 1940) § 8992-29.
Cf. Bryant v. Klatt, (D.C. N.Y. 1924) 2 F. (2d) 167 where father of defendant
deeded land to him under an oral trust for the father. Defendant, on the eve of bankruptcy, reconveyed to the father. The property was held to belong to the father as
against defendant's creditors, the coun saying that "the law treats the trust as valid as
long as the trustee does not choose to insist upon the absence of any writing'' and that
the grantee may recognize his '.'moral obligation" and his creditors cannot complain.
1

2

Principal case.at 632, citing 4 PAcE, WILLS, lifetime ed., 156-157 (1941).
For collection of cases on interpretation of residuary clause see IO A.L.R. 15 22
(1921).
1

2
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survivorship. The words, "Pay to Dtrs. only after death of mother," were written immediately above the printed matter. The defendants, after the mother's
death, withdrew this fund which they claim as their property. The plaintiffs sued
in assumpsit in the lower court claiming that this account is part of their mother's
estate and therefore included under the terms of an agreement, executed by all
the children soon after their mother's death, which provided for an equal division
of her estate among all the children. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiffs
appeal. Held, reversed. A bank account opened as a true joint account with right
of survivorship ordinarily vests a present interest in the parties. This would have
been such an account if the printed portion of the card had not been modified
by the written words which negative the idea of a present interest vested in the
defendants. · This provision excluded the daughters from participating in the
fund until after the death of the mother, leaving it at her disposal until that
time. 1 ~'Such a deposit agreement was therefore testamentary in character, and
the balance remaining in the account was part of the mother's gross estate." 2
This case differs from In re Lewis' Estate 8 where a depositor directed that his
account be made a joint one with his son, "the money to be drawn only in case
of my death." There the instrument was not testamentary in character as no
money could be drawn by either father or son during the former's life. Dissen~.
A present interest, similar to that of the son in In re Lewis' Estate, supra, was
here created in the daughters, although the enjoyment of such interest, by the
words "Pay to Dtrs. only after death of mother" was postponed until the mother's death. Onofrey 'U. W olliver, (Pa. I 944) 40 A. ( 2d) 35.4
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1939) tit. 7, § 819-903 provides that when a deposit is
made i~ the name of two or more persons the bank shall not pay out except on the order
of both or all of such persons "unless at the time of making the deposit a different arrangement shall have been specifically provided for ..••"
2
Principal case at 39 .
8
.
139 Pa. Super. 83, 11 A. (2d) 667 (1887).
4
On bank deposits in the name of depositor and another see 149 A.L.R. 879
(1944); 135 A.L.R. 993 (1941); 103 A.L.R. 1123 (1936); 66 A.L.R. 881 (1930);
48 A.L.R. 189 (1927).
1

